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Worker Ownership and Section 8(a)(2) of
the National Labor Relations Act
American workers have long experimented with employee ownership of
the industrial workplace.' Until recently, such experiments were sporadic
and usually unsuccessful, overshadowed in the labor movement by the
dominance of national trade unions and their focus on collective bargain-
ing.' In the last decade, however, the idea of the worker-owned firm has
achieved a new visibility. Such firms are now estimated to number be-
tween ninety and two hundred,' and the number continues to grow4 as
groups of employees, in an effort to preserve their jobs, attempt to
purchase plants about to be closed by corporate owners.5 Although
worker-owned firms in the United States today vary widely in size and
operation,' most, by their nature, exhibit some degree of worker participa-
1. Thomson, Employee Owned Companies: A New Look at an Old Phenomenon, MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS, Spring 1976, at 6.
2. Many early attempts at worker ownership involved producer cooperatives established by mem-
bers of a particular trade seeking to preserve their status in a world of rapid industrialization. I P.
FONER, HISTORY OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 179-81 (1947). Most of these
cooperative enterprises failed, and with the growth of national trade unions, the labor movement
instead focused primarily on the benefits workers could obtain from employers through collective bar-
gaining and unionization. See Gurdon, An American Approach to Self-Management, in WORKER
PARTICIPATION 295, 295 (H. Jain ed. 1980).
3. Compare SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., THE ROLE OF THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP OF BUSINESS iii (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter
cited as SENATE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS] (employees hold majority interests in at least 90 firms in
United States) with Long, Effects of Employee Ownership on Organizational Identification, Em-
ployee Job Attitudes, and Organizational Performance: A Tentative Framework and Empirical Find-
ings, 31 HUM. REL. 29, 31 (1978) (approximately 200 worker-owned firms in United States).
4. See Small Business Employee Ownership Act: Hearings on S. 388 Before the Senate Comm. on
Small Business, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 120-21 (1979) (statement of William F. Whyte, Professor of
Industrial Relations, Cornell University) (employee-owned firms spreading rapidly) [hereinafter cited
as Hearings on S. 388]. Approximately 80% of existing worker-owned firms were formed after 1971,
and approximately 57% of those firms were formed after 1975. SENATE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS,
supra note 3, at 1.
Two factors seem to explain the recent surge in worker ownership. First, attempts at worker own-
ership tend to proliferate during periods of industrial recession and high unemployment (such as the
1970's) as workers seek to protect their jobs. Gurdon, supra note 2, at 295. Second, various forms of
government assistance, ranging from tax incentives that encourage the use of Employee Stock Owner-
ship Plans to federally subsidized loans from agencies such as the Economic Development Administra-
tion of the Commerce Department, now somewhat lessen the financial obstacles faced by workers
seeking to buy their companies. See Ross, What Happens When Employees Buy the Company, FOR-
TUNE, June 2, 1980, at 108-09; Stern & Hammer, Buying Your Job: Factors Affecting the Success or
Failure of Employee Acquisition Attempts, 31 HUM. REL. 1101, 1109 (1978).
5. Approximately 70% of the worker-owned firms formed in the last decade were purchased by
workers seeking to save their jobs in the face of decisions by large conglomerates to dose marginally
profitable subsidiaries. SENATE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 3, at iv. In the last decade
alone, employees have purchased an estimated fifty companies. Id.
6. Worker-owned firms vary greatly in ownership structure and in the extent of workers' partici-
pation in management decisonmaking. See D. ZWERDLING, WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY 5-6 (1980).
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tion in management decisionmaking. The close labor-management ties
that result from that participation,7 however, may be subject to challenge
under section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),s
which prohibits employer domination or support9 of employee labor
organizations.' 0
Most such firms have between one hundred and four hundred employees, SURVEY RESEARCH
CENTER, INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, EMPLOYEE OWNERSHIP 8-9
(1978), although at least one worker-owned firm numbers its employees in the thousands, see Thom-
son, supra note 1, at 7-8 (discussing Chicago and Northwestern Transportation Company, with 3400
employee shareholders out of 14,000 employees). Most worker-owned firms, particularly those organ-
ized as cooperatives, have fewer members for two reasons. First, size beyond a certain point strains
workers' ability to raise the capital necessary to buy and operate a major factory or corporation.
Second, a large number of worker-owners may impede efforts to share management authority, at least
in cooperatives where many important decisions are made collectively. See K. BERMAN, WORKER
OWNED PLYWOOD COMPANIES 204-05 (1967).
The firms produce a large variety of products, see D. ZWERDLING, supra, at 53-79, 95-104
(describing variety of worker-owned firms), and appear most often in labor-intensive industries, see K.
BERMAN, supra, at 205. This concentration in labor-intensive industries has been explained as a result
of the increased productivity often associated with worker-ownership, see Olympia Veneer Co. v.
Comim'r, 22 B.T.A. 892, 901 (1931) (high wages to shareholders in plywood companies constitute
reasonable compensation because of greater productivity of worker-owners); SENATE COMM. ON
SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 3, at 18 (worker-owned firms generally have higher profits and greater
productivity than comparable firms), although some commentators question whether worker owner-
ship does in fact lead to greater productivity, see O'Toole, The Uneven Record of Employee Owner-
ship, 57 HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.- Dec. 1979, at 190; Ross, supra note 4, at 109. Among those who
believe that worker-owned firms are more productive, some attribute the improved productivity to
employees' recognition that they are working for themselves, c. D. ZWERDLING, supra, at 100
(worker-owners in plywood companies attribute impressive productivity to financial and emotional
involvement in their companies), while others contend that increased productivity is primarily attribu-
table to increased participation, see C. BELLAS, INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE WORKER-OWNED
FIRM 29, 35-40 (1972); Long, Share Ownership Versus Control, 31 HUM. REL. 753, 755 (1978); W.
Whyte, From Private to Employee Ownership: Notes for Transforming the Shut Down Plant 11
(Nov. 1976) (unpublished paper on file with Yale Law Journal).
7. See Gurdon, supra note 2, at 299-300 (worker ownership may lead to unusually active em-
ployee-management cooperation).
8. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
NLRA]. Section 8(a)(2) provides, in relevant part:
(a) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer. . . (2) to dominate or interfere with
the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other sup-
port to it: Provided, That. . . an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees
to confer with him during working hours without loss of time or pay .
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1976).
9. Charges of employer domination or support may be lodged under the general prohibitions of
section 8(a)(1), as well as under the more specific proscriptions of section 8(a)(2). See, e.g., Dennison
Mfg. Co., 168 N.L.R.B. 1012, 1013 (1967). Section 8(a)(1) provides: "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976). Section 8(a)(1)'s general
prohibition of interference includes but is not limited to all of the types of conduct specifically pro-
scribed in paragraphs (2) through (5) of section 8(a). 42 NLRB ANN. REP. 75 (1977). Subsequent
references to section 8(a)(2) should be read as including section 8(a)(1).
The appropriate remedy for a violation of section 8(a)(2) depends on the degree of employer assis-
tance. After a finding of domination, an employer is ordered to disestablish and cease dealing with the
dominated organization. After a finding of unlawful support, however, an employer is ordered only to
cease dealing with the supported organization, unless that organization is subsequently certified by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in a new representation election as the collective bargaining
representative of the employees. 14 NLRB ANN. REP. 57 (1950).
10. Section 2(5) of the NLRA defines a labor organization as
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This Note examines the problem posed for worker-owned firms by a
labor relations statute that contemplates a traditional adversary labor-
management relationship. The Note suggests that shared labor-manage-
ment interests, and the extent of worker participation in management pos-
sible in worker-owned firms, make conventional section 8(a)(2) analysis
inappropriate in the worker-ownership context. To grant worker-owned
firms organizational flexibility consistent with the NLRA's primary pur-
pose of promoting industrial peace," the Note proposes an amendment to
section 8(a)(2) that would permit management involvement with employee
labor organizations in certain worker-owned firms. The Note concludes
by suggesting criteria to assist courts and the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) in determining which worker-owned firms should not be
subject to judicial or administrative intervention under section 8(a)(2) as
amended.
I. The Phenomenon of Worker Ownership and the Policy of Section
8(a)(2)
Worker-owned firms differ greatly in organization and operation, rang-
ing from democratically managed producer cooperatives to more tradition-
ally supervised corporations. Current interpretations of section 8(a)(2),
however, may unnecessarily restrict the freedom of employee-owners to
experiment with innovative labor-management structures for their firms.
A. Patterns of Worker Ownership
The two main ways of structuring worker-owned firms are by means of
producer cooperatives and employee stock ownership plans. Producer co-
operatives, although relatively few in number," are among the most dem-
ocratic of worker-owned firms." In most producer cooperatives, each em-
ployee14 owns one share of stock and exercises one vote in shareholder
any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in
which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employ-
ment, or conditions of work.
29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1976).
Employer attempts to escape the strictures of section 8(a)(2) by claiming that a challenged employee
labor organization does not fall within the definition of section 2(5) almost never succeed. See Note,
Section 8(a)(2): Employer Assistance to Plant Unions and Committees, 9 STAN. L. REV. 351, 352-54
(1957); infra note 57.
11. See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257 (1939); NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 (1935); 79 CONG. REC. 7573 (1935) (remarks of Senator Wagner).
12. See SENATE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 3, at 13.
13. Producer cooperatives are best exemplified by a group of worker-owned plywood companies
located in the Pacific Northwest. For detailed analyses of those companies, see C. BELLAS, supra note
6; K. BERMAN, supra note 6.
14. The term "employee" as used in this Note includes nonshareholders as well as shareholders,
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referendums. Final authority over the company rests with the collective
membership, and all profits not reinvested in the firm are divided equally
among the employee-owners, regardless of which job an owner performs. 5
Employee shareholders elect fellow shareholders to a board of directors,"
and the board in turn retains a general manager to supervise the daily
operations of the company.'7 Stockholder committees often handle various
special problems, such as plant expansion or employee grievances.' 8 The
board of directors and individual shareholders are consulted by retained
management and participate in management decisions to a greater degree
than is usual in a traditionally owned firm."9
Producer cooperatives are not free from labor strife.20 Workers fre-
quently disagree with decisions made by retained managers and govern-
ance committees, particularly on matters of company investment and em-
ployee pay.21 A few worker-owned cooperatives are unionized,2 2  and
management-union relations in these firms are not always amicable.
23
Most worker-owned firms are characterized by a less broadly based
form of ownership effected through "Employee Stock Ownership Plan"
trusts, 24 or through the direct purchase by some workers of varying
but does not include supervisory personnel. The term "worker" is used here synonyomously with
"employee," and the terms "worker-owners" and "employee-owners" are used interchangeably to
indicate shareholder employees.
15. See K. BERMAN, supra note 6, at 8. In practice, most cooperatives depart somewhat from this
pattern. Many of the plywood cooperatives, for example, hire some nonshareholder employees, often
to handle especially unappealing jobs. Only in extreme cases, however, does the ratio of nonsharehold-
ers to shareholders become so high that the company loses its identity as a cooperative. Id. at 148-50,
155.
16. Id. at 157.
17. The general manager may be a shareholder or may be hired from outside the company. Id. at
158.
18. Id. at 157.
19. Id. at 158-59.
20. See id. at 124-28 (friction with unions often occurs in worker-owned firms taken over from
conventional companies); Shirom, The Industrial Relations Systems of Industrial Cooperatives in the
United States, 1880-1935, 13 LAB. HIST. 533, 547-48 (1972) (accounts of internal dissension in indus-
trial cooperatives).
21. See C. BELLAS, supra note 6, at 29 (employee-shareholders often reluctant to approve deci-
sions that require retention and reinvestment of earnings).
22. See SENATE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 3, at 11-12; c. D. Ellerman, The Union
as the Legitimate Opposition in an Industrial Democracy 5-12 (Dec. 1979) (unpublished paper on
file with Yale Law Journal) (unions still needed in worker-owned firms to act as "loyal opposition" to
management). Most members of producer cooperatives feel little need for unions, however, since the
ability of workers to participate in management decisions enables them to seek better wages and
working conditions on their own. See P. BERNSTEIN, WORKPLACE DEMOCRATIZATION 22 (1976).
23. See K. BERMAN, supra note 6, at 124-28 (history of plywood cooperatives' relations with labor
organizations). In at least one case, a strike by nonshareholder employees caused the temporary col-
lapse of a newly organized cooperative. Id. at 127-28.
24. Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) are governed by parallel provisions of the labor
law and the Internal Revenue Code. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 & Supp. III (1979)); I.R.C. § 4975 (1976 & Supp. III
1979)). ESOPs serve a wide variety of purposes. Under a typical ESOP, as used in the worker owner-
ship context, a corporation sets up an employee trust that borrows investment capital to purchase
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amounts of company stock." In such firms, individual employee owner-
ship interests vary. In some, management controls a majority of the stock
26
and runs the company as it would a traditionally owned firm, making few
efforts to increase worker participation in the decisionmaking process. 27 In
others, workers own and vote a majority of company stock and elect repre-
sentatives to a board of directors.2 Even then, however, some employees
may not have a significant voice in management decisions. 9
Even when production workers buy a majority of company stock, man-
agement personnel often refuse to share decisionmaking responsibilities
with workers20 Conflicts of interest may arise when some members of
company stock. The corporation then makes periodic payments to the trust, and the payments are
used to repay the original loan and release stock from the trust to individual employees. See S. REP.
No. 93, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1979). Since corporate contributions to the trust are tax deductible,
many corporations-as many as 4000 according to a recent estimate-use ESOPs as an inexpensive
means of raising investment capital. See Ross, supra note 4, at 109. Only rarely do ESOPs afford
employees majority ownership, and even then, voting restrictions placed on the stock may prevent
employees from exercising effective control over the company. See id.; D. ZWERDLING, supra note 6,
at 67. See generally Stern & Comstock, Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs): Benefits for
Whom? 23 KEY ISSUES 35-42 (1978).
25. About one-fourth of existing employee-owned companies were formed by direct employee
purchases of company stock. SENATE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 3, at 13. Direct stock
purchases are relatively recent phenomena and occur primarily when workers seek to buy a company
that would otherwise close or relocate. Id.
26. South Bend Lathe, Inc., a machine tool manufacturer located in South Bend, Indiana, is typi-
cal of such firms. South Bend Lathe was the first employee-owned company to be acquired wholly by
means of an Employee Stock Ownership Plan. In 1980, workers exercised voting control over 16% of
the company's stock, with management-appointed trustees voting the remainder. Workers have one
representative, a union official, on the board of directors, and an employee committee meets monthly
with the firm's president to discuss aspects of the business not considered "strictly confidential." D.
ZWERDLING, supra note 6, at 66-70; Ross, supra note 4, at 109-10. By 1985, production workers are
scheduled to control 66% of the company's stock and will probably participate more actively in man-
agement decisions. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 6, at 70.
27. A recent study indicates that employees in worker-owned firms "influence 'important deci-
sions'" in 51% of companies with ESOPs and 77% of companies with direct ownership. SURVEY
RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 6, at 20.
28. On average, workers are represented on the board of directors in 36% of companies with
ESOPs and 77% of companies with direct ownership. Id.
29. The history of the Vermont Asbestos Group, as narrated in D. ZWERDLING, supra note 6, at
53-62, illustrates some of the problems encountered by workers even in a financially successful
worker-owned firm. Initially, workers controlled 78% of the company's stock and elected a fifteen-
member board of directors composed of seven hourly workers, seven management representatives, and
a state official. Most important decisions, however, were made by the same top management officials
who ran the company before it became worker-owned.
The mine prospered under its new ownership, and production workers netted a 19.4% increase in
wages and benefits after the first year. Gradually, however, workers began to seek greater influence in
management decisions. In 1978, after management decided to establish a subsidiary wallboard com-
pany, a majority of workers voted against the proposal. The worker-elected board of directors, how-
ever, ignored the vote. Management and production workers became increasingly estranged, and the
union almost launched a strike when its wage demands were not met. Eventually, workers voted to
accept, at a substantial profit, the tender offer of a local businessman for a controlling block of the
company's stock.
30. Gurdon, supra note 2, at 303; see O'Toole, supra note 6, at 193 (most managers in worker-
owned firms unwilling to change labor-management responsibilities in response to altered patterns of
ownership).
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worker-owned firms, primarily management personnel, possess dispropor-
tionately large stock interests;" employee ownership may then serve sim-
ply to reinforce management's traditional status? The resulting frustra-
tion of worker-owners' expectations of heightened influence in
decisionmaking may cause a return to traditional adversary labor-manage-
ment relations and may encourage an unusually aggressive union stance
during collective bargaining.3 As both management and labor gain more
experience with worker ownership, however, they may learn to avoid such
difficulties.
3 4
B. Section 8(a)(2) Doctrine and Worker-Owned Firms
Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA is designed to protect the freedom of em-
ployees to choose the form of organization and collective action that best
suits their interests in dealing with management. Judicial interpretation
of section 8(a)(2) has evolved from an initial belief that free choice re-
quires nearly total insulation of employee labor organizations from man-
agement to a recognition that it permits a degree of "cooperation" between
management and workers' organizations.36 Yet even this recent, more ex-
pansive, interpretation of section 8(a)(2) may significantly impair the free-
dom of employee-owners to participate in management decisions.
31. Managerial employees tend to acquire disproportionately large stock interests in firms with
ESOPs, because stock in such firms is usually distributed in proportion to salary. SENATE COMM. ON
SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 3, at 4. Similarly, higher salaries often enable managerial employees to
dominate worker-owned firms that permit the direct purchase of company stock according to employ-
ees' financial capability. Hearings on S.388, supra note 4, at 142 (statement of David Ellerman,
economist, Industrial Cooperative Association).
32. See Gurdon, supra note 2, at 303.
33. Id. at 307. About one-third of employee-owned companies are at least partially unionized.
SURVEY RESEARCH CENTER, supra note 6, at 20. The function of these unions varies. In firms that do
not provide employees significant opportunities for participation in management, unions tend to play a
traditional adversary role. See W. Whyte, Making the Breaks at Rath 9-10 (1980) (unpublished
paper on file with Yale Law Journal); supra note 29 (history of Vermont Asbestos Group). In firms
that provide workers with significant influence on management decisions, most notably producer coop-
eratives, unions may be unnecessary. See infra note 85.
34. Professor Gurdon suggests several ways to lessen problems stemming from the frustration of
employee-owners' expectations of shared management authority, such as a two-class system of com-
mon stock designed to guarantee equal voting rights to all members of an employee-owned organiza-
tion. Gurdon, supra note 2, at 306-07.
35. See H.R. REP. No. 1147, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1935). As the Supreme Court observed in
one early decision, a critical question in section 8(a)(2) cases is whether an employee organization
exists as the result of the employees' free choice, or as the result of an employer's intrusion. NLRB v.
Linkbelt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 587-88 (1941). Lower courts have often stressed this goal of employee
free choice. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wemyss, 212 F.2d 465, 471-73 (9th Cir. 1954).
36. See Note, New Standards for Domination and Support Under Section 8(a)(2), 82 YALE Lj.
510, 511-25 (1973) (discussing evolution of section 8(a)(2) doctrine). Compare NLRB v. Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241, 251 (1939) (management involvement with em-
ployee labor organization unlawful despite employee satisfaction and absence of labor strife within
company) with Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1955) (courts must
distinguish between unlawful employer domination of labor organization and desirable labor-manage-
ment cooperation).
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1. The Traditional Approach to Section 8(a)(2)
The traditional enforcement doctrine for section 8(a)(2) emerged in
1939 with the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co." In that case, the Court ordered the dises-
tablishment of an employee labor organization, despite the employees' ap-
parent satisfaction with its representation of their interests..8 In ensuing
years, lower courts and the NLRB developed a virtual per se rule invali-
dating almost any form of employer assistance to employee labor organi-
zations, and proscribing most management efforts to share policy responsi-
bilities with employee groups."9
By the 1950's, however, the demise of the company union,40 the growth
of organized labor,4' and the decline in industrial warfare led many courts
to vary from the strict adversarial interpretation of section 8(a)(2) ad-
vanced in Newport News Shipbuilding.4 2 In 1955, the Seventh Circuit an-
nounced a less rigid interpretation of section 8(a)(2) in Chicago Rawhide
Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB.41 Although the Chicago Rawhide court re-
affirmed the long-established principle that section 8(a)(2) proscribes any
employer influence over employee labor organizations, it also held that in
order to further the NLRA's goal of promoting labor-managiblent coop-
eration, acceptable cooperation had to be distinguished from iipermissible
support. The court therefore reversed an NLRB directive disestablishing
an employee association formed jointly by the management of the com-
pany and its employees."'
37. 308 U.S. 241 (1939).
38. Id. at 251.
39. See Note, supra note 36, at 511-14 (discussing per se rule cases); Note, supra note 10, at 354-
60 (strict "hands-off" approach required of employer).
40. See Note, supra note 36, at 515-16.
41. In the 1940's, the widespread public sympathy enjoyed by the union movement during the
preceding decade began to decline. M. DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY,
1865-1965, at 430-31 (1970). Public policy also changed, as Congress became more concerned with
regulating unions than with protecting them. See Note, supra note 36, at 516. Thus in 1947, Congress
specified a list of union unfair labor practices comparable to the employer unfair labor practices set
forth in the NLRA. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat.
136 (1947) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-197 (1976)). In 1959, Congress first regulated the internal
structure of unions. Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griflin) Act, Pub. L.
No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976)).
42. In NLRB v. Valentine Sugars, Inc., 211 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1954), a forerunner of later
"cooperation" cases, the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the view that the NLRA reflects a class
conflict ideology. Focusing on the Act's larger aim of promoting "amity and cooperation," while
largely ignoring the Act's adversarial presuppositions, the court concluded that "courtesies" extended
by management to union members were not indicative, by themselves, of unlawful ehiployer support.
Id. at 320-21.
43. 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955).
44. The court's decision explicitly noted the NLRB's conclusion that similar employee representa-
tion plans had been routinely struck down in the past. Id. at 167. Nonetheless, the court found that in
this instance the NLRB had confused cooperation with support. The court's distinction between per-
missible and impermissible employer activity is tenuous at best: support is defined as employer actions
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Other courts have since held that the NLRA is designed to encourage
labor-management cooperation and that the distinction between domina-
tion and cooperation is important to that design." Courts adopting such
an interpretation refuse to disestablish a labor organization absent evi-
dence of actual employer domination or support" that exceeds mere coop-
eration and enters into the "proscribed domain of interference."' 7 Under
this view, many employer actions once considered virtual per se violations
of section 8(a)(2)" may no longer by themselves justify a finding of pro-
hibited domination or support."
Nonetheless, the Chicago Rawhide cooperation approach does not obvi-
ate the need for an amendment to section 8(a)(2). First, the notion of
cooperation is a vague one. Acts that considered individually might consti-
tute cooperation together may be considered unlawful domination. 0 Vir-
tually all the factors that have prompted courts to invoke section 8(a)(2) in
the past are still relevant in assessing whether employer-employee "coop-
eration" efforts cross the uncertain line between legitimate and illegiti-
exerting some degree of influence or control; cooperation is described as employer actions that only
assist employees in carrying out their independent intentions. Id.
45. See, e.g. , NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208, 1214 (1st Cir. 1979) (given changing
conditions, cooperative employer-employee arrangements justified as alternative to traditional adver-
sary relations); Federal Mogul-Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 1968) (cooperation does
not amount to support unless it hinders employees' freedom of choice); NLRB v. Post Publishing Co.,
311 F.2d 565, 569 (7th Cir. 1962) (cooperation is desirable objective under NLRA). As the Ninth
Circuit has observed, section 8(a)(2) read literally would bar any form of employer-employee coopera-
tion, and by so doing, would frustrate the NLRA's aim of allowing employees freedom of choice in
selecting their bargaining representative. Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 630 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 875 (1975).
46. See, e.g., NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208, 1213 (1st Cir. 1979) (actual, not
potential, domination must be found before disestablishment); Federal-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394
F.2d 915, 918 (6th Cir. 1968) (potential for employer domination inheres in employer-employee rela-
tionship, but only actual domination is unlawful); Coppus Eng'g Corp. v. NLRB, 240 F.2d 564, 573
(1st Cir. 1957) (even employee committee lacking independence from employer should not be disestab-
lished absent evidence of actual domination).
47. NLRB v. Keller Ladders, 405 F.2d 663, 667 (5th Cir. 1968); accord, NLRB v. Vernitron
Elec. Components, Inc., 548 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1977) (court must determine whether employer
conduct exceeds cooperation-interference boundary); NLRB v. Prince Macaroni Mfg. Co., 329 F.2d
803, 811 (1st Cir. 1964) (although not actually dominating employee labor organization, employer
overstepped line between cooperation and support by organizing and supervising employee committee
elections).
48. See Note, supra note 36, at 512 (listing examples of once per se illegal employer assistance).
49. See, e.g., NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208, 1213 (1st Cir. 1979) (employer's
payment of employee committee expenses does not constitute domination); NLRB v. Magic Slacks,
Inc., 314 F.2d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 1963) (employer's permission for union to use company time and
premises does not amount to assistance and support).
50. District 65, Distributive Workers of Am. v. NLRB, 593 F.2d 1155, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(acts considered individually might constitute cooperation, but courts must consider them in aggrega-
tion; pattern of employer assistance may imply that union's majority support is "tainted"); Hesston
Corp., 175 N.L.R.B. 96, 103 (1969) (thin line between cooperation and support, but even innocent
support may be unlawful); see 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 95 (1937) (section 8(a)(2) violations found when
acts "in their totality constitute domination or interference with a labor organization").
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mate support."1 The Chicago Rawhide approach has simply raised the
threshold showing of employer involvement necessary to sustain an unfair
labor practice charge. Finally, the NLRB has not clearly adopted the co-
operation approach. In one recent case, for example, the Board ruled that
an employer's provision of company facilities to an employee-initiated
committee violated section 8(a)(2) even though the Board found that the
"parties dealt at arm's length and in a manner similar to a legitimate
collective bargaining relationship.""2
2. Application of Conventional Doctrine to Worker Ownership
Without further refinement, even a liberal interpretation of section
8(a)(2) may restrict greatly the freedom of worker-owners to experiment
with new structures capable of responding to the unusual pressures and
opportunities for labor-management interaction that exist in many
worker-owned firms. In many such firms, the traditional distinctions be-
tween management and labor blur."3 Frequently, active union support is a
prerequisite to the initial purchase of a plant on the verge of liquidation
by its corporate owner."' Union members and officials often become part
owners of the new enterprise, sometimes participating in its management
and serving on its board of directors."5 Since union representatives on a
board may adopt management positions," it is hard under such circum-
51. The criteria considered by courts and the NLRB as evidence of domination or support in
1980, see GUIDEBOOK TO LABOR RELATIONS (CCH) 153-54 (1980), are strikingly similar to the
criteria considered significant shortly after the NLRA was passed, see 3 NLRB ANN. REP. 113
(1938).
Little consistency is to be found in decisions of courts or the NLRB as to the precise location of the
cooperation-support boundary. See NLRB v. Vernitron Elec. Components, Inc., 548 F.2d 24, 26 (1st
Cir. 1977) (support-cooperation boundary difficult to mark precisely); Longchamps, Inc., & Local
650, Chain Restaurant Employees Union, 205 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1031 (1973) (same). Some courts pay
particular attention to evidence of employee satisfaction or employer intent. See Chicago Rawhide
Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 170 (7th Cir. 1955); Note, supra note 36, at 520-25. Other courts
find neither criterion controlling. See NLRB v. Vernitron Elec. Components, Inc., 548 F.2d 24, 26
(1st Cir. 1977). That imprecision sometimes leads to opposite results despite similar facts. Compare
Columbus Janitor Serv., 191 N.L.R.B. 902 (1971) (management's efforts to persuade employees to
choose one labor organization over another held unlawful) and Greystone Knitwear Corp., 136
N.L.R.B. 573 (1962), afl'd, 311 F.2d 794 (2d Cir. 1963) (same) with Coamo Knitting Mills, Inc.,
150 N.L.R.B. 579 (1964) (similar management preference shown one labor organization over another
held permissible) and Jolog Sportswear, Inc., 128 N.L.R.B. 886 (1960) (same), petition dismissed
sub. noa. Kimbrell v. NLRB, 290 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1961).
52. See American Tara, 242 N.L.R.B. 1230 (1979).
53. This is especially true of cooperatives, in which directors are also working stockholders. See P.
Pitegoff, Unions and Workers' Cooperatives: Labor Law Implications 7-8 (Jan. 15, 1980) (unpub-
lished paper on file with Yale Law Journal).
54. See Stern & Hammer, supra note 4, at 1113; W. Whyte, supra note 33, at 9.
55. See Thomson, supra note 1, at 12.
56. A dramatic example of this phenomenon occurred at the worker-owned Vermont Asbestos
Group, when worker representatives on the board of directors approved a management proposal in
direct defiance of a vote by fellow workers. See supra note 29. At the worker-owned South Bend
Lathe company, described in supra note 26, one union official resigned from the board of directors
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stances to attribute true arms-length, adversarial bargaining to labor-man-
agement relations. 7 Employee stock ownership accentuates the problem,
for actions likely to benefit workers at the company's expense may be con-
trary to the ownership interests of union shareholders.58
In addition to the blurring of traditional labor-management distinctions,
differing employee ownership interests may create inherent conflicts of in-
terest even among employee-owners with identical jobs. 9 Employees with
significant stock holdings, for example, may wish to reinvest earnings in
the company, while workers with smaller holdings may wish to receive all
earnings in the form of wages.6" Similarly, employees afforded long-term
because he felt he could not simultaneously represent both labor and management; another union
official remained on the board, but admitted that working with management had "moderated" his
views. See D. ZWERDLING, supra note 6, at 70, 173.
Labor leaders have long feared that conflicting loyalties stemming from union participation in man-
agement decisions or from union representation on corporate boards might undermine the traditional
role of unions as adversarial counterweights to management power. See D. ZWERDLING, supra note 6,
at 172-74; Summers, Worker Participation in the US. and West Germany: A Comparative Study
from an American Perspective, 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 367, 370-71 (1980).
57. Problems of interdependence may also arise in nonunionized worker-owned firms, at least in
those firms in which management attempts to provide employees a voice consistent with their owner-
ship holdings. As in unionized firms, the independence of worker representatives serving on the board
of directors may be called into question. In addition, nonunionized employee-owned companies may
attempt to govern by means of in-plant employee-management committees. See K. BERMAN, supra
note 6, at 157. Yet employee committees sharing management responsibilities may prove especially
susceptible to charges of domination and support. See Note, Does Employer Implementation of Em-
ployee Production Teams Violate Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act? 49 IND. L.J.
516, 531-36 (1974); Note, The West German Model of Codetermination Under Section 8(a)(2) of the
NLRA, 51 IND. L.J. 795, 812-13 (1976). Under the conventional approach to section 8(a)(2), exten-
sive employer involvement with such committees almost invariably results in findings of unlawful
domination or support. See, e.g., Ed Taussig, Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 470, 476 (1954) (employer support
for employee management committee violates section 8(a)(2) even though insubstantial and in good
faith). But see Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 875 (1975) (employee-initiated labor-management committees are permissible absent evidence of
employee dissatisfaction).
58. See Long, supra note 3, at 47 (employees hesitate to strike against company in which they
have invested). Employees in some worker-owned firms may be willing to accept wage and benefit
reductions, the introduction of labor-saving machinery, and stricter job discipline if their firm en-
counters financial difficulties. See K. BERMAN, supra note 6, at 186-87; cf Gurdon, supra note 2, at
302 (employee-ownership generates greater job satisfaction, greater commitment to company, and
greater anti-union sentiment).
59. These conflicts may pose further problems for worker-owners under the judicial doctrine of
fair representation, which requires a union to represent fairly all employees in a bargaining unit. As
developed in the cases, a union or other bargaining representative is permitted "[a] wide range of
reasonableness. . . subject always to complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its
discretion." Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). See generally Summers, The
Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What Constitutes Fair Representa-
tion? 126 U. PA. L. REV. 251 (1977). This minimum standard of good faith may be difficult to satisfy
if some union members or officers have a financial stake in the company that predisposes them to a
particular position.
For similar reasons, it also may be difficult to determine the appropriate bargaining unit in a
worker-owned company. Cf NLRB v. Fort Vancouver Plywood Co., 604 F.2d 596, 600 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915 (1980) (difficult to draw line between shareholder "workers" and
nonshareholder "employees").
60. See supra p. 618 (problems caused by desire of some workers to convert most profits into
wages); supra note 29 (conflict over management proposal to use surplus funds to build new factory).
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security through share ownership may oppose a pension plan desired by
employees with smaller ownership interests.'
Some courts may be sufficiently influenced by the unusual characteris-
tics of worker-owned firms to permit a considerable degree of employer
assistance to labor organizations formed by employee-owners. The lan-
guage used in some decisions upholding management-assisted labor orga-
nizations suggests that a significant amount of assistance may be accept-
able, as long as it can be demonstrated that employees are satisfied and
that management is not manipulating employees' choice of a bargaining
representative. 2 In practice, however, courts are unlikely consistently to
adopt such an expansive view of section 8(a)(2). Even under liberal inter-
pretations of traditional section 8(a)(2) doctrine, the absence of arms-
length bargaining often serves as the basis for a finding of unlawful domi-
nation or support, especially if coupled with traditional indicia of prohib-
ited interference, such as the provision of company premises ' or the pres-
ence of management representatives at union meetings." Such findings
may be even more likely in light of the fact that a degree oflabor-manage-
ment cooperation exists in many worker-owned firms that is greater than
the degree courts have thus far recognized as acceptable.
In addition, both Congress and the Supreme Court have indicated their
disapproval of owner- or management-assisted labor organizations under
the current NLRA. In 1947, Congress explicitly rejected a proposed
amendment that would have permitted employer-initiated and -assisted la-
bor organizations when employees did not themselves designate a bargain-
ing representative. s Similarly, in 1959 the Supreme Court in NLRB v.
61. Cf. D. ZWERDLING, supra note 6, at 70 (older employees at worker-owned company unable to
accumulate sufficient stock equity in company to match lost pension rights).
62. See supra pp. 621-22 (courts that apply liberal interpretation of section 8(a)(2) are strongly
influenced by evidence of employee satisfaction and employer good faith); Note, supra note 36, at 519-
25 (proposing employer intent and employee satisfaction as standards for evaluating section 8(a)(2)
complaints).
63. The NLRB regarded union use of company premises as evidence of section 8(a)(2) violations
in 125 of the 136 cases involving that issue considered between 1950 and 1974. Kesselring & Brinker,
Financial and Material Support Under Section 8(a)(2), 31 LAB. L.J. 3, 6 (1980).
64. Active involvement of supervisory personnel in union affairs led to findings of unlawful domi-
nation in 86 of the 107 NLRB cases considering that issue that arose between 1950 and 1974. Kessel-
ring & Brinker, Employer Domination Under Section 8(a)(2), 30 LAB. L.J. 340, 343 (1979). In some
cases, the NLRB ruled that the involvement of supervisory personnel in employee labor organizations,
though not per se evidence of domination, did constitute evidence of unlawful support. Id. at 346.
65. The proposed amendment read in part:
(d) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section, the following shall not constitute or
be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act: (3) [fnorming or
maintaining by an employer of a committee of employees and discussing with it matters of
mutual interest, including grievances, wages, hours of employment, and other working condi-
tions, if the Board has not certified or the employer has not recognized a representative as their
representative under section 9.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., § 8(d)(3) (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT 31, 56 (1948). For a discussion of the significance of this
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Cabot Carbon Co."' rejected the notion that employer-assisted committees
were somehow exempt under the Taft-Hartley Act from section 8(a)(2)'s
proscription of domination and support. 7 Accordingly, even courts willing
to permit a considerable degree of management involvement in labor orga-
nizations under current doctrine nonetheless must recognize that section
8(a)(2) prohibits employer involvement in employee labor organizations
beyond a certain critical level. Some worker-owned firms, by placing
worker representatives on boards of directors, forming employee-manage-
ment governance committees, and undertaking other forms of employee
participation in management, have moved far beyond that level.
As worker-owners experiment with new structures for labor-manage-
ment interaction, the degree of management assistance is likely to increase,
further exceeding levels found acceptable under current doctrine. If a dis-
gruntled employee or a competing union decides to challenge the structure
of labor-management relations in a worker-owned firm, courts and the
NLRB might impose conventional section 8(a)(2) sanctions and thereby
greatly circumscribe the freedom of employee-owners to participate in
management. By greatly restricting employer involvement in labor organi-
zations, the traditional domination or support doctrine could thus unnec-
essarily limit efforts to increase employee participation in management
decisionmaking, even when extensive employee participation is the most
efficient way to run a firm. 8 The proscription of joint labor-management
committees may deny employees an opportunity to influence important
areas of company policy that fall outside the traditional scope of collective
bargaining, including investment and other entrepreneurial decisions. 9
Limitations on employee participation may also discourage vital union
support for the formation of a worker-owned firm. 0 If a union actively
assists in the purchase of an employee-owned company, and later becomes
extensively involved in its management, a finding of unlawful domination
might permanently prohibit that union from continuing to represent the
company's employees, even if the employees want to maintain the union
proposed amendment, see Note, supra note 36, at 525-27.
66. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
67. Id. at 217.
68. Cf Hearings on S. 388, supra note 4, at 120 (worker participation in management essential to
maintenance of efficient employee-owned firm).
69. An employer is legally bound to bargain with a union about "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). Although outer boundaries delimiting the
subjects that fall within this statutory duty to bargain are not clear, the duty does not reach decisions
"which are fundamental to the basic direction of a corporate enterprise or which impinge only indi-
rectly upon employment security." Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). Thus an employer is free to decide unilaterally fundamental issues
such as the choice of a product line or the sale of the business. See Summers, supra note 56, at 381.
70. Cf Stern & Hammer, supra note 4, at 1113 (union support important factor in enabling
employees to buy their company); W. Whyte, supra note 33, at 9 (same).
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as their representative.71 Thus the implementation of current section
8(a)(2) doctrine in the worker ownership context may frustrate the
NLRA's stated goals of promoting industrial peace and employees' free-
dom of choice.
II. The Problem of Independence Reconsidered
The traditional approach to management-employee relations derives.
from analysis of conventionally owned firms in which ownership and
managerial interests are clearly separable from employee interests. That
approach does not take into account the greater identity of interests be-
tween labor and management possible in a worker-owned firm, or the
greater ability of worker-owners to participate in management decision-
making. As a result, the traditional approach, with its continuing empha-
sis on preserving the structural independence of employee labor organiza-
tions, may unnecessarily frustrate labor-management cooperation in
worker-owned firms. Under certain conditions, worker-owners do not
need the protections afforded by section 8(a)(2). The NLRA should be
amended to provide for that possibility.
A. The Inadequacy of Traditional Section 8(a)(2) Analysis
Conventional section 8(a)(2) analysis is based on an "adversary" theory
of labor relations.7" In this view, apparent in the legislative history of the
NLRA," labor and management constitute distinct entities with inher-
ently conflicting interests.7 " Before the enactment of the NLRA, manage-
ment occupied the dominant position in labor-management conflicts by
reason of its control over workers' jobs.75 Proponents of the NLRA argued
that the "lone industrial wage earner"" was too weak to bargain equally
71. See supra note 9 (disestablishment orders accompany findings of unlawful domination).
72. See Note, supra note 36, at 514-15 (adversary model presumes employers have interests an-
tagonistic to interests of employees, and that employers will subvert employee interests given the op-
portunity). According to one contemporary critic, the Act assumes that most employers are exploiting
labor and will do so whenever afforded an opportunity. M. DERBER, supra note 41, at 358 (citing
Paul Litchfield, president of Goodyear Tire and Rubber in 1934).
73. The NLRA was enacted during a period of widespread and often violent industrial turmoil;
the Act's legislative history is replete with references to industrial warfare and the "economic struggle
or competition between employer and employees as to the share or division between them of the joint
product of labor and capital." H.R. REP. No. 1147, supra note 35, at 10 (quoting American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921)).
74. Areas of potential conflict between management and labor include "[d]ivision of the returns,
quest for security, concepts of responsibility to owners and the public, and survival issues or rivalry
for power." D. DE SCHWEINITZ, LABOR AND MANAGEMENT IN A COMMON ENTERPRISE 125 (1949).
In a conventional business, gains won by labor in collective bargaining (e.g., increased wages) often
represent management losses (e.g., diminished profits). See Ellerman, supra note 22, at 10.
75. See N. CHAMBERLAIN, THE LABOR SECTOR 153 (1965) (NLRA necessary to enable workers
to counterbalance management control over jobs).
76. S. REP. NO. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1935).
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with an employer unless acting in concert with other employees." The
Act's supporters therefore felt it essential to protect by law the right of
employees to organize." Section 8(a)(2) was included as part of that pro-
tection to ensure that once formed, employee labor organizations would
not be subject to management influence or control that might undermine
their position in an adversarial negotiating process.
79
The adversary approach to section 8(a)(2) analysis is ill-suited to the
worker-ownership context. The presumption of conflicting labor-manage-
ment interests is not warranted in many worker-owned firms because em-
ployee ownership may generate an identity of interests between employer
and employees, thereby reducing the bipolar conflict between management
and labor that characterizes traditionally owned firms. Improving the eco-
nomic performance of a worker-owned company directly benefits workers
as owners by increasing the value of their share of annual profits." As
workers strive to increase productivity and refrain from actions that might
prove detrimental to the company, management may respond in turn by
expanding the role of workers in setting company policies.81 To the extent
that labor-management interests converge, efforts to preserve the separa-
tion of management and labor may unnecessarily restrict beneficial labor-
management cooperation.
It is unrealistic, however, to expect the interests of management and
labor in a worker-owned firm ever to coincide fully. Issues distinct from
the production of profits, such as working conditions, job assignments, and
plant discipline, may not fall within the expanded area of shared labor-
management interests generated by employee ownership holdings. 2 In ad-
dition, worker-owners may disagree on the appropriate division of com-
pany profits among wages, benefits, and investments. 3 Even in coopera-
77. See id.
78. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 1147, supra note 35, at 16; 79 CONG. REC. 7566-73 (1935) (remarks
of Senator Wagner).
79. See 79 CONG. REC. 7569-73 (1935) (remarks of Senator Wagner).
80. This convergence of interests appears most clearly in worker-owned cooperatives, in which
each worker-shareholder has the same financial stake in the company. See K. BERMAN, supra note 6,
at 158-59. A similar convergence between the goals of management and the goals of workers occurs in
firms with some sort of economic return to workers apart from wages. According to one commentator,
when such an economic return is present, management and labor both "begin to operate more con-
sciously toward the same organizational goal of higher output at lower cost and toward similar per-
sonal goals of a satisfying and self-esteemed worklife." P. BERNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 67 (emphasis
in original).
81. See P. BERNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 68 (increased worker attention to company costs alters
managers' goals from employee manipulation to joint consultation).
82. Cf K. BERMAN, supra note 6, at 153-57 (allocation of jobs and plant discipline sometimes
sources of friction in plywood cooperatives).
83. See SENATE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 3, at 12 (workers' desire for take-home
pay conflicts with long-term investments recommended by management).
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tives, in which each owner shares equally in company profits, conflicts
may arise, if only as to how best to pursue common goals. 4
In some worker-owned firms, areas of potential conflict may undermine
significantly the identity of labor-management interests generated by em-
ployee ownership. Whether worker-owners will then need the protection
of section 8(a)(2), however, depends in large measure on whether worker
participation in management is sufficient to offset the inequality in bar-
gaining power that the NLRA was designed to redress. To the extent that
workers protect their interests as individual employees through participa-
tion in management decisionmaking, there is correspondingly less need for
them to organize for collective action to exact concessions from manage-
ment in adversarial negotiations. 5 When worker-owners are denied a role
in management decisions, labor and management tend to return to their
traditional adversary relationship," and unions tend to play their custom-
ary role. 7
B. Section 8(a)(2) Standards and the Range of Worker-Owned Firms
Courts that find management assistance to employee labor organizations
in worker-owned firms excessive under current section 8(a)(2) analysis
may issue cease and desist orders,8 regardless of the disruptive effects
such orders may have.8 In addition to limiting employee participation in
the management of the affected firm, the threat of such adverse judicial
intervention may deter other worker-owned firms from experimenting
with new forms of labor-management cooperation. To avoid unduly con-
straining worker-owners, courts hearing section 8(a)(2) challenges must
first recognize the diversity of ownership interests and managerial ar-
rangements in firms under the "worker-owned" rubric.
Producer cooperatives present the clearest case against limiting manage-
ment-labor interaction. In most such companies, decisionmaking power
84. See C. BELLAS, supra note 6, at 29 (difficult to persuade some workers in plywood coopera-
tives to take long-range view of possible returns).
85. According to one industrial theorist, unions may be superfluous in worker-owned firms be-
cause the primary function of unions-wresting decisionmaking power from the holders of capital- is
by definition unnecessary when workers are themselves the holders of capital. P. BERNSTEIN, supra
note 22, at 22. Where democratization is only partial, however, unions may have an important role to
play. Id. at 22; see supra note 22 (employees in producer cooperatives feel little need for unions
because they can effectively seek better wages and working conditions on their own).
86. Gurdon, supra note 2, at 307; see Whyte, In Support of Voluntary Employee Ownership, 15
SOCIETY 73, 80 (1978), quoted in Hearings on S. 388, supra note 4, at 120 (labor relations strained
when employees realize discrepancy between their status as co-owners and their treatment as hired
hands).
87. See supra p. 620 & note 33.
88. See supra note 9 (remedies for violations of section 8(a)(2)).
89. See supra pp. 626-27 (harms to worker-owned firms caused by unnecessary section 8(a)(2)
sanctions).
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ultimately vests in the entire membership, and the interests of manage-
ment and labor coincide closely." Attempts to preserve the independence
of employee groups as bargaining entities separate from the employer are
therefore unnecessary.
Conversely, conventional section 8(a)(2) standards for intervention are
most appropriate for firms in which individual employee ownership inter-
ests are minimal and workers do not participate in management. In such
cases, the area of shared labor-management interest is not likely to be
much greater than in traditional firms, and the relationship between man-
agement and labor remains predominantly adversarial despite the employ-
ees' financial stake in the company. Without the protection afforded em-
ployees by participation in management decisionmaking, the need for
independent employee labor organizations, with power to bargain equally
with management, remains." In such firms, the implementation of con-
ventional section 8(a)(2) doctrine is appropriate.
The more difficult cases lie between those two extremes. In many
worker-owned firms, employees possess both limited ownership interests
and limited power over management decisions.92 Insofar as labor and
management interests diverge in such firms, employee groups must be
protected from employer domination under the guise of cooperation. The
need for the protection of section 8(a)(2) lessens, however, as the worker-
owned firm under examination is less like a traditionally owned company
and more like a true cooperative.
C. Amending the National Labor Relations Act
Since the strictures of section 8(a)(2) may in some cases frustrate the
interests of employees as worker-owners, the NLRA should be amended
to accomodate the unique status of worker-owned firms. An appropriate
amendment would exempt worker-owned firms from the requirements of
section 8(a)(2) to the extent indicated by shared labor-management inter-
ests and by worker participation in management. 3 Such an amendment
90. See supra note 80 (identity of labor-management interests greatest in producer cooperatives).
91. The frustration of employee-owners' expectations of participation in the management of a
worker-owned firm may lead to even greater tension in labor-management relations than that found
in a similar but traditionally structured firm. See Gurdon, supra note 2, at 304-05.
92. See supra pp. 618-20 (description of worker-owned firms with differing ownership and man-
agement structures).
93. Such an amendment should take the following form:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this section, the following shall not constitute or be
evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act: Assistance by an
employer provided to a labor organization of employee-owners, where employee ownership
interests and opportunities for participation in management decisionmaking enable such an
assisted labor organization to represent the employees as effectively as could a fully indepen-
dent labor organization.
This amendment would not require any changes in the definition of terms now found in section 2 of
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would further the underlying purposes of the NLRA by promoting both
labor-management cooperation and industrial tranquillity.
94
Two criteria should govern the implementation of the proposed amend-
ment. These criteria are designed to identify worker-owned firms that do
not benefit from the protection of section 8(a)(2) and that therefore should
be exempt from its restrictions. The amendment and the criteria permit
judicial or administrative intervention in only those worker-owned firms
in which the benefits of employee ownership are reduced to the mere pos-
session of a financial investment.9
1. Distribution of Ownership Interests
Since the need for intervention under section 8(a)(2) lessens as the in-
terests of management and labor converge, courts and the NLRB should
consider the extent to which employee-ownership holdings create an area
of shared labor-management interests beyond that commonly found in tra-
ditionally owned firms. When employee ownership interests are substan-
tial and widespread, and the area of shared labor-management interests is
correspondingly great, there is little reason for judicial or administrative
intervention. If ownership interests are relatively evenly divided among
employees, any self-interested reluctance on the part of employee bargain-
ing representatives to press demands harmful to a company's financial po-
sition generally will reflect the self-interest of other employees.
In many worker-owned firms, however, a large majority of employees
may be nonshareholders 96 or may have only insignificant ownership inter-
ests.97 In such cases, the convergence of labor-management interests assod-
ated with employee ownership may not occur. Under these circumstances,
courts should be willing to hold a worker-owned firm subject to section
8(a)(2), especially if a large percentage of employee representatives own
disproportionately large interests in the company relative to the ownership
interests of employees as a whole. 8
the NLRA, and could be added to the current statute as a proviso following section 8(a)(2).
94. By exempting from section 8(a)(2) only those firms in which assisted labor organizations re-
present the interests of employee-owners as effectively as could fully independent labor organizations,
the amendment would promote beneficial labor-management cooperation without sacrificing em-
ployee-owners' legal protection against detrimental support.
95. Cf Gurdon, supra note 2, at 305 (if no meaningful influence flows from ownership, many
employees treat ownership interests as simple financial investments).
96. The Chicago and Northwestern Transportation Company furnishes one example. Less than
one-fourth of the firm's 15,000 employees owned company stock as of 1976. Union leaders, who are
among those with substantial investments in the company, claim stock ownership has not affected
their willingness to strike. In line with company hopes, however, union-management relations have
been unusually smooth. See Thomson, supra note 1, at 7.
97. See Long, supra note 6, at 758.
98. Substantial ownership interests may co-opt employee bargaining representatives. The poten-
tial conflict of interest presented by such a situation might also merit judicial scrutiny under the duty
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2. Employee Participation in Management Decisionmaking
Courts and the NLRB also should consider the extent of employee par-
ticipation in management decisionmaking. If all employees have an oppor-
tunity for significant participation in setting company policy on subjects
ordinarily within the scope of collective bargaining,"' employees may fur-
ther their own interests directly without the constraints of an adversarial
negotiating process. In such cases, employee-owners can influence man-
agement decisionmaking through a combination of methods: electing man-
agers, placing representatives on the board of directors, or serving on vari-
ous in-plant labor-management committees."'
Within any worker-owned firm, however, the significance of employee
participation depends upon the degree of control employees exercise over
particular decisions, the issues subject to employee influence, and the level
at which that influence is exercised.1"' Determining whether employee
participation in a particular firm is sufficient to support judicial and ad-
ministrative nonintervention may often involve a complex inquiry by the
trier of the fact. 10 2 In making that determination, certain factors merit
close attention. Workers are most likely to acquire influence in decision-
making through parity"0 3 or majority representation on the board of direc-
tors and otl~er management bodies. Elaborate organizational structures
apparently designed to provide for an employee voice in management deci-
sions should not, however, furnish support for judicial nonintervention if
in reality workers' representatives are relegated to a minority voice in
of fair representation, see supra note 59, or under more general doctrines of fiduciary responsibility.
99. See supra note 69 (describing subjects coming within statutory duty to bargain).
100. Workers in cooperatives generally have access to all of these avenues of influence: important
financial and policy decisions require shareholder ratification; lesser management decisions are over-
seen by worker-elected directors; and various special problems fall within the province of stockholder
committees. See K. BERMAN, supra note 6, at 8. Similar avenues of participation exist to varying
degrees in other worker-owned firms, with mixed results. See D. ZWERDLING, supra note 6, at 5-6.
101. The possible range and significance of each of these factors are considered in detail in P.
BERNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 47-61.
102. The history of the American Cast Iron Pipe Company, a South Bend, Indiana, machine tool
manufacturer, demonstrates the potential danger of confusing the opportunity for democratic manage-
ment with its implementation. The company was turned over to workers by its founder, who hoped to
institute a participatory system of worker self-governance that would operate to the benefit of labor
and the public. Formally, employees were given considerable voice in the firm's management: worker
representatives participated in the selection of directors, received access to company records, and
shared in the operation of the company's disciplinary council. In practice, however, management rep-
resentatives on the board of directors outvoted workers' representatives on most policy decisions. One
commentator described American Cast Iron Pipe's participatory structure as a "mask" for one of the
city's "last great nonunion bastions of corporate paternalism." See Zwerdling, Looking for Workers'
Control, in 2 WORKING PAPERS FOR A NEW SOCIETY 1, 13-14 (1974).
103. Parity representation alone is no guarantee of employee influence in setting company policy.
In the Vermont Asbestos Group, production workers and management officials initially were repre-
sented equally on the company's board of directors. Nonetheless, important decisions were still made
by the executive board that ran the firm before its conversion to employee ownership. See supra note
29.
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most policy decisions. 10 4 Courts and the NLRB should also consider the
extent of employee access to management-level information concerning the
company's operations, financial status, and future prospects.105 Such access
is necessary if employees are effectively to take advantage of opportunities
to participate in setting policy.' 6 Finally, courts and the NLRB should
determine the extent to which procedural guarantees protect the rights of
individual employees. Employees should be assured, for example, that
criticism of majority-supported managerial policies or procedures will not
provoke reprisals from management or from fellow workers.'07
Conclusion
The conventional approach to section 8(a)(2), based on judicial and ad-
ministrative experience with the adversarial interaction of labor and man-
agement, has only a limited value when applied to worker-owned firms.
Conventional section 8(a)(2) remedies are necessary to protect the bar-
gaining process only in those worker-owned firms with a narrow distribu-
tion of ownership interests and with little worker participation in manage-
ment. In many other worker-owned firms, the underlying goals of the
NLRA are best served by permitting imaginative and flexible labor-man-
agement interaction unconstrained by conventional section 8(a)(2)
doctrine.
104. As in the American Cast Iron Pipe Company, see supra note 102, the influence of employ-
ees' representatives may be neutralized by rules allowing management to choose a majority of the
members serving on labor-management committees. Such a relegation of worker representatives to a
minority voice is common in worker-owned firms in which managers hold controlling blocks of shares.
See D. ZWERDLING, supra note 6, at 5-6. Similar problems arise when employee ownership is effected
through an ESOP trust, with management-appointed trustees exercising voting control over trust
stock. Id. at 67.
105. At the Vermont Asbestos Group, for example, management refused to provide financial and
managerial information desired by the employee-owners. See D. ZWERDLING, supra note 6, at 59.
106. See P. BERNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 69-74; W. Whyte, supra note 6, at 14. Bernstein sug-
gests that in addition to displacing workers from their position as co-managers, the withholding of
information may generate mistrust between labor and management that reduces economic efficiency
and leaves a company in a worse position than before worker participation was first attempted.
Management may withhold information from workers out of habit or a desire to maintain indus-
trial secrecy. P. BERNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 70. Managers at the Vermont Asbestos Group, for
example, blamed production workers for leaking confidential information to the public. D.
ZWERDLING, supra note 6, at 59. In addition, management may feel that workers lack the ability to
use such information. P. BERNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 71. The experience of the plywood coopera-
tives, however, demonstrates that, given an opportunity, workers can educate themselves sufficiently to
participate productively in business decisions. See D. ZWERDLING, supra note 6, at 99.
107. See P. BERNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 75; P. Pitegoff, supra note 53, at 4. The possibility that
a majority coalition of employees might act in ways detrimental to the interests of a minority is
lessened by the duty of fair representation, which requires the bargaining representative to represent
fairly all employees in a bargaining unit. See supra note 59.

